Career Concerns and 'Unpaid' Executives by Chen, Hui et al.
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2822979 
 
Career Concerns and “Unpaid” Executives* 
 
Hui Chen 









University of Melbourne 
naomiss@unimelb.edu.au 
 
May 21, 2018 
 
 
Abstract: A significant portion of CEOs in publicly-listed Chinese state-owned enterprises 
receive zero pay from the companies for which they work. Instead, they are paid directly by 
their controlling shareholder who can be the Chinese government or parent firms controlled 
by the Chinese government. While their actual pay is unobservable, it is known to be low and 
contain few performance-based incentives. We explore how these parent-paid executives are 
motivated and whether the outcomes of this unusual incentive differ from conventional 
compensation. Consistent with career concerns as their main incentive, we find that these 
CEOs have a significantly higher probability of future promotion than other CEOs. We also 
conduct an event study using the Split Share Structure Reform in 2005. The reform liberalized 
the Chinese stock market and enhanced the role of the market mechanisms that potentially 
replaced promotion incentives in executive compensation contracts. Our evidence is generally 
consistent with a reduction in the strength of promotion incentives following the reform. 
Further analyses indicate that, compared to peers that directly pay their CEOs, firms with 
parent-paid CEOs have higher return on assets and asset growth, and they experience less 
tunneling by their shareholders.  
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A surprisingly high portion of the executives of publicly-listed Chinese state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) do not receive any compensation from the firms for which they work. 
During our sample period of 1999–2011, almost 40% of the highest ranked executives in 
publicly listed Chinese SOEs received zero pay, that is, the pay disclosed for these executive 
officers/directors in company filings with the Chinese stock exchange is zero.1 The Chinese 
business community and popular press are puzzled over this phenomenon and often attribute 
it to the underdevelopment of the market system in China.2 In this paper, we attempt to 
provide some insight into this unusual compensation practice by examining it as an incentive 
mechanism and evaluating its effectiveness. 
The Chinese press refers these executives as “unpaid”, which is a misnomer. Rather 
than being paid by the publicly-listed companies that officially employ them, most of these 
unpaid executives are actually paid by their firm’s controlling shareholder and the details of 
the compensation are not publicly disclosed. Controlling shareholders are either a government 
agency or a parent company controlled by the government. Compared to their peers who are 
directly paid by the publicly listed companies, compensation of the unpaid executives is 
unobservable, but is significantly lower3 and Chinese compensation schemes contain few 
performance-based incentives (Conyon and He 2011; Bryson et al. 2014). In the remainder of 
the paper, we refer the executives that are paid by their firms’ controlling shareholders as 
“parent-paid” and those that are paid directly by their firms as “firm-paid”.  
                                                            
1 This is different from the case of undisclosed pay. When a firm chooses not to disclose the pay of an executive, 
the database reports the corresponding pay level as “undisclosed”. 
2 For example, Business magazine warned that zero pay is terrible, claiming that resulting disincentives could 
lead to worse consequences than overly high pay (Ma, 2009). Securities Daily reported that 346 CEOs of 
publicly-listed firms received zero pay in year 2012, and therefore “may not care about firm performance” (Jiao, 
2013). More recently, China Securities Journal pointed out the executives in almost 300 firms received zero 
compensation, while their peers in other firms enjoyed a significant raise (Dai, 2016). 
3 Starting in 2012, firms were required to disclose compensation even for CEOs who were paid by the parent. In 
unreported analysis for 2012, we find that total compensation is significantly lower for CEOs who were paid by 
the parent rather than by the company for which they worked. 
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This phenomenon of parent-paid Chinese executives is unique and differs significantly 
from a few other cases of compensation practice that may seem similar on the surface. For 
example, many tech company founders such as Google’s Sergey Brin and Larry Page, 
Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg, Tesla’s Elon Musk, choose to receive zero compensation or 
one dollar token pay. In these cases, the lack of pay is due to their enormous personal wealth 
(Hamm et al. 2015), most likely created through their company share ownership. Clearly, this 
is not the case for Chinese CEOs, since these CEOs own very few shares of their companies, 
if any. Another case is where executives work mainly in the headquarters but have nominal 
positions in the subsidiaries. This is common in family firms or firms owned by private equity 
investors. In contrast, our study focuses on CEOs whose responsibilities in the subsidiaries 
are full time in nature, but are paid by the headquarters.  
The uniqueness of these parent-paid executives stems from the fact their incentives are 
not driven by financial rewards alone. While they are significantly under-paid and under-
incentivized through monetary compensation, other forms of incentives could make up the 
missing portion of CEO motivation and discipline. In this paper, we argue that the parent-paid 
executives are strongly motivated through implicit incentives. We investigate how career 
concerns may motivate parent-paid executives and whether outcomes differ from a pure 
conventional financial incentive approach.  
We first investigate whether career concerns incentives differ between parent-paid and 
firm-paid CEOs. Career concerns are an incentive related to “concerns about the effect of 
current performance on future compensation” (Gibbons and Murphy 1992, p. 468). Career 
concerns can be manifested through consideration of one’s reputation, hope for promotion, or 
avoidance of termination, etc. Fama (1980) suggests that competition in the labor market 
alone might give managers sufficient incentives without explicit agency contracts. In our 
setting, the primary labor market mechanism for CEOs to advance is promotion. We explore 
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CEO promotions to a government position and business promotions, either to a higher-level 
title in the parent group or to an executive position at a larger firm.     
Using a dataset of 8,602 SOE firm-years between 1999 and 2011, we find that relative 
to firm-paid CEOs, parent-paid CEOs have a three times higher probability of getting 
promotion in the following year. Our results support the conjecture that parent-paid CEOs 
have a strong incentive related to future promotion. However, it is possible that the higher 
promotion probability is driven by the pre-selection of CEOs with superior quality for the 
parent-paid contracts. To rule out this alternative explanation, we first examine the relation 
between the choice of a CEO to sign a parent-paid contract and the career outcome of her 
predecessor, which serves as a proxy of ex ante expectation of promotion. We find that the 
promotion of an outgoing CEO is significantly associated with the incoming CEO’s 
willingness to accept parent-paid contract. Using this proxy of ex ante expectation as 
instrument, our two-stage model analyses provide further evidence consistent with use of 
promotion incentives. We then control for innate characteristics of CEOs by exploring cases 
where CEOs switch between firm-paid contracts and parent-paid contracts during their tenure. 
Compared to their peers without a contract change, we find that CEOs switching from firm-
paid to parent-paid contracts enjoy a higher probability of future promotion, while CEOs 
switching from parent-paid to firm-paid contracts have a lower probability of future 
promotion. These robustness tests indicate that our findings are consistent with implicit 
incentives rather than CEO pre-selection. 
To further demonstrate the link between promotion outcome and the composition of 
incentives, we conduct an event study using the 2005 Split Share Structure Reform (hereafter, 
“Reform”). In an attempt to mitigate conflicts between controlling and non-controlling 
shareholders, the Reform allows shares that were initially non-tradable (typically owned by 
the government) to be traded freely in the stock market. The Reform further privatizes and 
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liberalizes the Chinese stock market by improving its liquidity, operating efficiency, and 
corporate governance (Li et al. 2011; Chen et al., 2012; Liao et al. 2014; Ke et al. 2015). As a 
consequence, the Reform reduces the need for internally generated incentive systems in 
executive compensation by strengthening the effects of external governance mechanisms, 
such as takeovers and monitoring by other groups of shareholders. We expect the promotion 
incentive for parent-paid executives to become weaker after the Reform and the incentives of 
parent-paid and firm-paid executives to become similar. The results of our analyses are 
consistent with our prediction, providing evidence that subsequent to the Reform, the 
probability of future promotion for parent-paid CEOs declined. 
We next examine the association between performance outcomes and career concerns 
as a managerial incentive. Contrary to the concerns raised by the Chinese popular press, we 
find that the performance of firms with parent-paid CEOs is in line with that of their peers 
with firm-paid CEOs. In fact, we find that firms with parent-paid executives tend to have 
higher return on assets and asset growth, while the stock returns, asset turnover, sales growth, 
and growth in number of employees are not significantly different from firms with firm-paid 
executives.  After controlling for executive perks, however, firms with parent-paid CEOs 
exhibit better operating efficiency and higher sales growth. The results indicate that career 
concerns can effectively motivate CEOs.  
Prior research provides evidence that Chinese SOEs engage in “tunneling”— the 
transfer of resources from publicly listed subsidiaries to the government-owned parent firm. 
In our setting, it is also possible that the strong promotion incentives drive parent-paid CEOs 
to act in preference to the parent company rather than minority shareholders. We examine 
tunneling as a potential downside of the promotion incentives. Surprisingly, for the entire 
sample period, firms with parent-paid CEOs tunnel less via transfers to controlling 
shareholder than firms with firm-paid CEOs.   
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Our paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, it provides a unique 
natural experiment to empirically examine the effectiveness of career concerns relative to 
monetary incentives through performance-based pay. Career concerns have been difficult to 
examine with data from typical executive labor markets such as in North America, since they 
essentially represent an unobservable variable at individual level. Empirical studies have 
provided support for the effectiveness of career concerns in various settings, such as mutual 
fund managers avoiding termination (Chevalier and Ellison 1999), CEOs near retirement 
seeking for board positions (Brickley et al, 1999), mid-level managers seeking promotions 
(Ederhof, 2011), and sports coaches facing intense labor market competition (Cadman and 
Cassar, 2014). This prior research could only use inexact measures such as the executives’ 
age and tenure to proxy for career concerns. In contrast, Chinese SOEs offer a unique setting 
where the firm-paid and parent-paid executives face different incentive methods and where 
we can control for individual characteristics.  
Second, we provide insights regarding a significant portion of firms that have been 
ignored in prior literature. CEOs of almost 40% of the firms in our sample that have parent-
paid CEOs are generally omitted from research on Chinese compensation because their pay is 
not reported. This results in an incomplete picture of compensation practices and their impact 
on Chinese companies. Furthermore, prior research has shown that the pay-performance 
sensitivity in Chinese firms is significantly lower than that of comparable American firms (i.e., 
Conyon and He 2011; Bryson et al. 2014). The managerial incentive through performance-
based pay seems to be especially low in publicly listed Chinese SOEs. We find evidence that 
career concerns can provide as strong (if not stronger) incentives as conventional 
performance-based pay and that this incentive scheme does not appear to lead to anti-
productive behaviors such as tunneling. Our findings thus provide insights into why Chinese 
SOEs perform well despite their seemingly inadequate use of typical incentives.  
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Third, given the prevalence of business groups in emerging markets and some 
developed countries, our findings have implications for design of employment contracts 
involving unconventional incentive mechanisms. Our evidence on promotion incentives 
complements the existing findings on the importance of internal labor market in business 
groups (Tate and Yang 2014; Belenzon and Tsolmon 2016; Cestone et al. 2018). Our result of 
less tunneling by parent-paid executives also relates to prior literature of tunneling in business 
groups (e.g., Johnson et al. 2000; Bertrand et al. 2002; Siegel and Choudhury 2012; Buchuk 
et al. 2014). 
Finally, our study shows unexpected consequences of the Split-Share Structure 
Reform on the incentives of SOEs. Prior literature emphasizes efficiency gains from increased 
marketization of stemming from the reform (e.g., Li et al. 2011; Chen et al., 2012; Liao et al. 
2014). Our results indicate that the reform has damped the strength of career concern-related 
incentives for SOE executives. 
2. Background and hypotheses development 
2.1. Institutional setting 
As China transitions to a market economy, Chinese SOEs have become increasingly 
more market-oriented and the Chinese government has sought to enhance SOE efficiency. 
However, due to social and political concerns SOEs continue to be subject to government 
interference (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). The government can compel SOE firms to enter 
government-favored industries, pay additional taxes, increase local employment regardless of 
need, or provide social services to alleviate fiscal and employment problems (Bai and Xu 
2005; Bai et al. 2006). SOEs also are subject to fulfilling governmental objectives (Lin and Li 
2008). For example, the mission set out for the Chinese SOEs, under the 11th five-year plan 
(2006–2010), was to “grow bigger and stronger” and, under the 12th five-year plan (2011–
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2015), to “upgrade economic structure and pursue excellence.” These objectives do not 
necessarily align with market incentives. 
Representing the government, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission of the State Council (SASAC) regulates and supervises SOEs at both national 
and local levels. SASACs appoint, evaluate, compensate, dismiss, and promote SOE 
executives. Although SASACs have tried to promote incentive pay that links firm 
performance measures such as profit, profitability, and Economic Value Added© to salaries, 
their efforts have largely been unsuccessful. This is largely because SASAC decisions often 
reflect political priorities of the government rather than market-based considerations. The 
majority of executive salaries still depend on firm location, industry, firm size, and the 
executive’s bureaucratic rank, job type and personal qualifications.  
The majority of SOE executives come either from the bureaucratic system or from 
internal SOE promotions.  Due to social concerns, the government has imposed regulations 
capping executive compensation at some multiple of the average pay of employee.4 Moreover, 
SASACs are conservative with respect to providing high-powered incentives such as equity 
compensation. Even in the rare cases when executives do get some equity incentives, it is still 
difficult for them to pocket the gains from increased stock value. These granted stocks are 
thus more window-dressing than genuine compensation (Chen et al. 2013). 
Career incentives play a large role for SOE executives. After serving in SOEs for a 
length of time, many SOE executives obtain government positions. An example is Gang Xiao, 
the former chairman of Bank of China (a central SOE), who was promoted to become the 
chairperson of China Securities Regulatory Commission in 2013 (the regulator of Chinese 
                                                            
4 For instance, in 2004, SASAC issued “Interim measures on compensation of managers in central enterprises”. 
It specified that base salary of a manager could not exceed 5 times of average employee salary in SOEs. Starting 




stock market). SOE executives can also be promoted via transfer to another SOE. On May 27, 
2016, Zou Lei, the chairman of Harbin Electric Corp., became the chairman of Dongfang 
Electric Corp., and Zefu Si, the general manager of Dongfang Electric Corp., became the 
chairman of Harbin Electric Corp. In both cases, the new positions were with larger 
companies, resulting in more prestigious positions. Appendix A provides an example of the 
structure of a typical local-level SOE. 
2.2. Career concerns 
An economic agent can be motivated through various incentive schemes. An explicit 
incentive system typically includes a formal contract that specifies a pre-determined relation 
between the manager’s performance and pay. In contrast, career concerns do not involve 
formal contracts. Instead, the agent exerts effort today in the hope for a reward tomorrow. 
This reward could be a new job, a promotion, avoiding termination, or simply a good 
reputation in the labor market. For example, a politician or a junior faculty member may work 
diligently in the hope of being reelected or tenured, despite the lack of performance-based pay 
in their compensation.  
Holmstrom (1982) models career concerns through a two-period game, in which the 
agent’s second-period pay depends on first-period performance. The agent must determine 
how much effort to exert in the first period to maximize total utility across both periods. The 
principal tries to infer the agent’s ability from the first-period performance and uses that 
information to determine second-period pay. In equilibrium, the agent exerts positive effort 
even when wages in both periods are fixed (zero pay-for-performance sensitivity).5  
 Empirical research on career concerns often uses age or job horizon as a proxy for 
strength of the incentive. For example, Gibbons and Murphy (1992) find that the general 
                                                            
5 Note that the incentive provided by career concerns is not without flaws: agents typically over-exert earlier in 
their careers and under-exert later. 
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sensitivity of the executive’s pay is significantly stronger for those who will retire soon than 
for those who still have many years until retirement. This is because younger executives have 
stronger career concerns and can be motivated without performance-based pay. In contrast, 
compensation for older executives must be explicitly linked to their performance for them to 
be motivated. Chevalier and Ellison (1999) study the behavior of mutual fund managers and 
their incentive to avoid termination. They find that young managers herd to avoid 
unsystematic risk and stay in their jobs. Yim (2013) finds that younger CEOs are more 
aggressive in mergers and acquisitions, since acquisitions tend to significantly increase a 
CEO’s future compensation. 
 Of course, career concerns are not limited to young managers. For example, CEOs 
near retirement, who seek post-retirement board positions, demonstrate significantly better 
performance (Brickley et al. 1999). Although Gayle et al. (2015) suggests that career concerns 
are most effective at the middle ranks, Ederhof (2011) finds evidence that mid-level managers, 
who have weaker chance to be promoted to the top level, have fewer incentives related to 
career concerns and receive stronger bonus-based incentives. 
China offers a unique experimental setting in which to examine incentive issues 
related to career concerns. Due to its political ideology and rapidly expanding economy, the 
incentive mechanisms used in China and other parts of Asia often differ from those in western 
economies. First, although CEO pay appears to be positively related to stockholders’ wealth, 
firm profits, or both, pay-performance sensitivity for firms controlled by private block holders 
is still quite low (Conyon and He 2011). Prior literature also finds mixed results on 
performance-based managerial incentives in the Chinese SOE setting. Mengistae and Xu 
(2004) find that unlisted SOE executives’ pay is linked to firm performance. However, Firth 
et al. (2006a) and Cao et al. (2011), find no evidence of pay-for-performance sensitivity in 
firms controlled directly by government agencies, although there is some evidence of a 
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positive sensitivity in firms controlled by the government through multiple layers. Prior 
literature on Chinese firms largely excludes executives paid by the parent group from the 
research design. Consequently, results in the literature might underestimate managerial 
incentives for SOE executives. Further, CEO turnovers in SOEs consist of both promotions to 
higher ranks in business groups and political positions in governments. Perhaps due to 
omitting consideration of these characteristics, prior studies show mixed results on turnover-
performance sensitivity. For instance, Groves et al. (1995) find that management turnover in 
unlisted SOEs is negatively related to firm performance. Firth et al. (2006b) find that listed 
SOEs exhibit turnover-performance sensitivity. Kato and Long (2006) and Ke et al. (2012) 
fail to find a relation between executive turnover and firm performance in SOEs.  As an 
exception, Cao et al. (2014) examine the substitution effect between the political motivation 
and monetary incentives. Specifically, they find that monetary incentives (based upon levels 
of compensation) are weaker when CEO incentives are driven by political career concerns. 
However, parent-paid executives are still missing from their sample. 
A substantial literature has examined implications of political connections as a proxy 
for career concerns. For instance, Fan et al. (2007) focus on China’s newly partially privatized 
firms during 1993-2001, and find that three-year post-IPO stock returns are lower for firms 
with politically connected CEOs than for those without politically connected CEOs. In 
contrast, using data from 2001 to 2005, Hu and Leung (2009) find a significant increase in 
firm performance following the appointment of political executives in SOEs—a performance 
improvement that does not occur in firms that appoint managers without political 
backgrounds and experience.  
We argue that political connection is not necessarily a good proxy for career concerns 
as an incentive mechanism. While political connections may increase the number of available 
jobs, promotions are more likely to be based on performance while on the job. Promotions for 
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CEOs are also likely to be business rather than political in nature (in our sample, they are 
twice as likely) and are therefore less likely to be driven by political connections. Our setting 
thus provides a cleaner proxy for career concerns by using the probability of future promotion. 
We also control for the CEO’s work history in the government, which has an indirect relation 
with these incentives.  
2.3. Hypothesis development 
Unlike firm-paid CEOs, parent-paid CEOs receive less compensation from their 
contracts. Their pay is primarily based on their rank, pay grade and seniority. Although they 
may receive nonmonetary perquisites, granting of these benefits does not appear to be 
performance-based. This means that the SOEs cannot rely on monetary incentives to provide 
incentives for parent-paid CEOs. We therefore argue that the primary performance incentive 
for these executives is the possibility of promotion (i.e., career concerns) (Holmstrom 1982). 
A higher likelihood of promotion increases the strength of the incentive, so stronger 
incentives related to career concerns should manifest in a higher likelihood of future 
promotion for parent-paid CEOs in comparison with firm-paid CEOs. Our first hypothesis is 
therefore: 
H1: Ceteris paribus, relative to firm-paid CEOs, parent-paid CEOs have 
higher probability of future promotion. 
 
Thus far, we have argued that parent-paid CEOs’ behaviors are predominantly 
affected by promotion incentives, since other types of incentives such as monetary 
pay for performance and market incentives play a small role in their contracts. 
However, if the nature of incentives changes, we expect to see a change in the 
strength of promotion incentives.  
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The Split Share Structure Reform of 2005 significantly changed the structure 
of incentives within the Chinese financial market. Prior to the Reform, the Chinese A-
share stock market had a “split share” structure, featuring two types of shares: 
tradable and non-tradable. The non-tradable shares (comprising about two-thirds of 
the stocks in the A-share market) were stocks primarily owned by the Chinese 
government and affiliates. The split share structure was a legacy from the partial 
privatization of the Chinese economy and caused problems such as market illiquidity, 
operating inefficiency, and poor corporate governance (Sun and Tong 2003; Wei et al. 
2005). 
The Reform allowed the formerly non-tradable shares in the A-share market to 
gradually free float, with some SOE firms selected for pilot tests and other firms 
following shortly afterward. By the end of year 2007, almost all stocks in the Chinese 
A-share market were converted to tradable shares. Research has provided empirical 
evidence consistent with improved market incentives following from the Reform, 
with better risk sharing (Li et al. 2011), improvements to SOE performance (Liao et al. 
2014), improved corporate governance (Cumming et al. 2011), and reduced cash 
holdings by SOE firms (Chen et al. 2012). 
We argue that the Reform affects incentives for SOE firm executives overall and will 
differentially impact firm-paid versus parent-paid CEOs. After the Reform, market incentives 
become more effective, because SOE block holders can now exit (Hope et al. 2017) and the 
corporate control market becomes an active tool for the government (Ke et al. 2015). The 
Reform thus allows the market to more strongly discipline CEOs through mechanisms such as 
takeovers and enhanced monitoring by other groups of shareholders, rather than having to rely 
on promotion incentives. We thus conjecture that the shift toward market discipline will 
reduce the intensity of promotion incentives provided. Because we expect parent-paid CEOs 
13 
 
to initially have the strongest promotion incentives, as both types of firms become more 
exposed to market incentives, we expect that parent-paid CEOs will face a larger reduction in 
promotion incentives:  
H2: Relative to the pre-Reform period, the probability of future promotion for 
parent-paid CEOs decreases after the Reform.  
 
Given the incentive related to promotion for parent-paid CEOs, a natural question that 
arises is the effectiveness of this incentive, especially in comparison with the CEOs’ firm-
paid peers. It is possible that this type of contract results in stronger incentives for managers 
to perform. Of course, assuming incentive mechanisms are applied in an optimal way, ceteris 
paribus there should be no difference in performance outcomes under the different incentive 
schemes. However, off equilibrium results can always occur. For example, parent-paid CEOs 
may have better connections with the government and thus may enjoy an unfair advantage. 
On the other hand, the parent SOE may put the CEOs in place to extract resources from the 
company to pursue its own agenda such as social objectives, which would result in lower 
levels of financial performance and lower efficiency. It is thus an empirical question whether 
the promotion incentives related to career concerns result in the company performing better 
relative to more traditional compensation contracts, which place a higher weight on explicitly 
defined performance-based pay. This leads to our second hypothesis, with two parts. 
H3a: Ceteris paribus, financial performance of companies with parent-paid 
CEOs does not differ significantly from companies with firm-paid executives.  
H3b: Ceteris paribus, operational efficiency in companies with parent-paid 
CEOs does not differ from companies with firm-paid executives.  
 
While a private firm seeks to maximize its profit due to market incentives, SOE 
interests at least partially reflect those of the government. SOEs often maximize a weighted 
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average of firm profit and the welfare of other parties in the economy. Thus, SOEs may place 
more emphasis on firm growth, because a larger organization is more likely to fulfill the 
societal needs of more jobs and goods. Further, unlike a private firm, an SOE may consider 
employment as a high priority and have incentives to overproduce (Bova 2015).  
The parent companies for the SOEs do not necessarily trade publicly. These untraded 
parent SOEs have a broader objective than publicly traded subsidiaries. Unlike publicly 
traded firms, these firms also face less discipline from external monitoring and more 
interference from government. If possible promotion provides effective incentives for 
achieving the parent SOE’s goals, parent-paid CEOs should focus on overall growth since the 
government specifically sets mission for “grow bigger and stronger”. We should therefore 
observe higher growth in firms with parent-paid CEOs relative to firms with firm-paid CEOs:  
H3c: Ceteris paribus, growth in companies with parent-paid CEOs is higher 
than growth in companies with firm-paid executives. 
 
It is possible that the parent SOE appoints parent-paid executives to siphon wealth 
from publicly traded subsidiaries to the parent. Prior research provides evidence that Chinese 
CEOs engage in “tunneling,” which is a transfer of subsidiary resources to the parent firm 
(Jiang et al. 2010). Cheung et al. (2010) find negative impacts of tunneling particularly for 
local (as opposed to central government) SOEs.6  
 In our setting, the association between tunneling and whether the CEO is officially 
paid by the company is not straightforward. If the parent-paid CEO is placed in the company 
to extract resources, then there should be more tunneling. On the other hand, due to stronger 
career concerns incentives, parent-paid CEOs may have stronger incentives to run the 
business successfully and thus, be less likely to tunnel: 
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H4: Ceteris paribus, tunneling by companies with parent-paid CEOs does not 
differ from tunneling by companies with firm-paid CEOs.  
3. Research design 
3.1. Data and sample selection 
Our initial sample consists of all local SOEs listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges from 1999–2011.7 We exclude firms in the financial industry and those with 
missing information, resulting in a total of 8,602 final firm-year observations. 
We choose 1999 as the beginning of our sample period because that is when publicly 
listed firms in China started to systematically report executive compensation. Sample firms’ 
financial information, compensation information, and governance information are from the 
China Stock Market and Accounting Research database (CSMAR). Following prior literature 
(Firth et al. 2006b; Kato and Long 2006; and Ke et al. 2012), we refer to the “chairperson of 
the board,” the highest-ranked executive in the database, as the CEO of the sample firm. We 
manually collect executive characteristics from their published biographies. We also manually 
collect information about each CEO’s next job after s/he leaves the listed firm by reading the 
firms’ announcements and news reports. 
3.2. Variables 
We separate our sample into parent-paid and firm-paid CEOs. We define a CEO as 
parent-paid if she receives no compensation from the listed firm and as firm-paid CEO if her 
compensation is greater than zero. Ppaid, a dummy variable of parent-paid, equals to 1 if a 
CEO receives zero compensation from the listed firm and zero otherwise. Table 1 contrasts 
the sample sizes of firm-paid CEOs and parent-paid CEOs by year.  Among the total of 8,602 
firm-year observations, 3,379 (approximately 40%) report that the CEO receives zero 
                                                            
7
 We focus on local SOEs because the management of SOEs has been experienced a trend of decentralization 
since 1990s (Huang et al 2017).  
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compensation from the firm. The percentage of parent-paid CEOs is quite stable across the 
sample period, indicating persistence of this unusual compensation practice. 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
Following a CEO’s career path, we examine two types of promotions: (1) political 
promotion to a position as government official, or (2) business promotion to a higher-level 
position in the parent group or an executive position at a larger firm. We construct a dummy 
variable (Promotion) that takes value of 1 if a CEO leaves for a job in the government, a 
higher position in the parent group, or as an executive position of a larger firm in the 
following year, and 0 otherwise. In addition to promotion, a CEO turnover can also result 
from retirement, health issue or mergers and acquisitions (i.e., change in control right). The 
retirement age for government employees including SOE managers is 60 for men and 55 for 
women. We identify cases of retirement by reading firm announcements and verifying the 
CEOs’ age, and other cases through firm announcements. We then construct a variable to 
measure CEO turnover due to demotion (Demotion): 1 if a CEO leaves her position due to 
reasons other than retirement (including health issues), change in control right, or promotion, 
and 0 otherwise. Demotion cases also include executive turnovers due to criminal charges or 
regulatory charges. We also construct a composite measure that includes the continuum of 
career outcomes (CareerOutcome), which takes value -1 for demotion, 1 for promotion, and 0 
for all other outcomes.  
3.3. Research model 
To examine whether parent-paid CEOs have a higher probability of being promoted, 
we estimate the following model: 
Promotiont+1 = β0 + β1Ppaidt + β2Aget + β3Male + β4Dualt + β5AROAt + β6SalesGrowtht  
+ β7Sizet + β8Leveraget + β9Largestt + β10CEOsharet + β11Governmentt 
+ εt                                                                                                                                                (1) 
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 The dependent variable is the future probability of promotion (Promotion). We also 
use the two alternative promotion-related dependent variables described above: Demotion, 
which represents negative career outcomes; and CareerOutcome, the continuum measure of 
career outcomes. We use a probit model for Promotion and Demotion, and estimate the model 
with CareerOutcome via an ordered probit. We expect β1 to be positive for the models with 
Promotion and CareerOutcome and negative for the model with Demotion. 
We include a battery of control variables to separate the promotion incentive from 
promotion based upon CEO characteristics and firm performance. Age is the CEO’s age. Male 
is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO is male and 0 otherwise. Dual is a dummy 
variable, taking value of 1 if a chairman is also the general manager of the listed firm and 0 
otherwise. Prior literature suggests that many Chinese CEOs have political connections (e.g., 
Fan et al. 2007). Since the CEOs for SOEs are officially appointed by the government, 
political connection may benefit a CEO in the promotion decision. We thus control for the 
CEO’s political connection with a dummy variable (Government) that equals 1 if the CEO 
had worked for the government or military before joining the listed firm and 0 otherwise. 
AROA is the average of return on assets (net income deflated by average assets) during CEO’s 
tenure in a given year. Sales growth is firm sales in year t minus sales in year t-1, deflated by 
sales in year t-1. Size is natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets. Leverage is the ratio of the 
firm’s total liabilities over total assets. Largest is the percentage of the firm’s stockholdings 
owned by the largest shareholder whose ultimate owner is the Chinese government. 
CEOshare is the percentage of shares owned by a CEO.  
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Univariate analyses 
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Panel A of Table 2 provides some univariate statistics for the firm-paid and parent-
paid CEO samples. Parent-paid CEOs are older and more likely to be male. On average, firm-
paid CEOs are 50.4 years old and parent-paid CEOs are slightly older with age of 51. Both 
groups are predominately male. While these figures differ from a statistical perspective, the 
values are not economically different. There are much greater differences across the 
subsamples in other areas. Parent-paid CEOs are more likely to have work experience in the 
Chinese government, including in the military (42.1% for parent-paid versus 34.6% for firm-
paid), implying a closer tie with the government than for firm-paid CEOs.8 Parent-paid CEOs 
are also less likely to hold dual positions (chairperson of the board and general manager) in 
the firm (2.0% for parent-paid versus 18.9% for firm-paid). The average tenure of the CEOs 
does not significantly differ between parent-paid and firm-paid CEOs (4.467 years versus 
4.558 years respectively). Parent-paid CEOs are much more likely to hold a job title in the 
parent company (77.4% versus 45.8% for firm-paid CEOs). In addition to job titles in the 
listed firm, parent-paid CEOs on average have 1.8 other job titles, which is significantly more 
than the average of 1.3 job titles for firm-paid CEOs.9 
Overall, 10.1% of the parent-paid CEOs experience a promotion, 3 times larger than 
that of firm-paid CEOs (2.4%). This difference between the groups in the probability of future 
promotion (either political promotion or business promotion) after they leave the publicly 
listed firms is both statistically and economically significant.10 Parent-paid CEOs are less 
likely to be demoted (6.5% versus 9.2% for firm-paid CEOs), perhaps indicating the CEOs’ 
                                                            
8
 We note, however, that there are a significant number of cases where the same CEO appears in our sample as 
paid in one year and unpaid in another year. This means that the choice of contract is not CEO-specific. We also 
find that the type of contract can differ from year to year within the same firm. 
9 Note that the CSMAR dataset only systematically provides information of job titles in other firms starting in 
2001.  
10
 To provide further insights, we divide the probability of promotion into business and political promotions, the 
parent-paid group exhibits significantly higher level of promotions in both categories than the firm-paid group 
by 1.6% (for political promotions) and 6.1% (for business promotions).  The results show that promotions for 
CEOs are more likely to be business than political in nature, implying that promotions are not driven by political 
connections. We jointly consider both types of promotions in our multivariate models 
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higher ability or as additional enticement for these managers to accept lower-paying positions. 
For the sample as a whole, parent-paid CEOs have a significantly more positive career 
outcome (0.036 versus -0.068).   
Our descriptive statistics regarding whether a CEO’s predecessor received a 
promotion (Prepromotion = 1), indicate that 38.3 percent of the predecessors of our sample 
parent-paid CEOs were promoted, which is significantly higher than those of firm-paid CEOs 
in the sample (26.4 percent). Assuming that CEOs benchmark their future prospects by career 
outcomes of their predecessors, these results provide preliminary evidence that the two groups 
of CEOs face different incentive schemes, with parent-paid managers more likely to be 
incentivized by promotions.  
We find further differences across CEO types at the firm level. Firms with parent-paid 
CEOs are significantly larger, with mean total assets of RMB 4.5 billion, which is almost 10% 
higher than for firms with firm-paid CEOs. The largest shareholder for firms with parent-paid 
CEOs has an average stock holding of 45.3%, which is 4.3% more than the average 
government stock holding in the firm-paid group. CEO share ownership is quite small for 
both groups, although statistically higher for firm-paid CEOs. On average, the parent-paid 
executives own 26,357 shares, which is significantly lower than 557,056 shares owned by the 
firm-paid executives. The two groups of firms are similar with respect to the degree of 
leverage and the percentage of independent directors on board of directors.  
In general, operating performance is similar across samples, although average sales 
growth and asset turnover for the parent-paid group are significantly higher than for firms 
with firm-paid CEOs (significant at 1% for both). Although both groups have a negative 
average stock return, the parent-paid group’s return is about 2% less negative than the firm-
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paid group. Both groups have similar administrative expenses, changes in total assets, and 
changes in the number of employees.  
Following Cheung et al (2010), Jiang et al. (2010) and Jian and Wong (2010), we use 
two proxies for tunneling: “Transfer” and “OtherAR.” Transfer is defined as total amount of 
fund transfers through related party transactions from the listed firm to its parent company 
and/or other firms in the same group over total assets. OtherAR is defined as the firm’s 
balance of other receivables over total assets. Although tunneling via “Transfer” does not 
differ significantly by CEO type, tunneling via OtherAR is significantly higher in the firm-
paid sample.  
Because we have panel data, individual CEOs are represented more than once in the 
dataset. For a more direct univariate comparison of firm- versus parent-paid CEOs, panel B of 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics comparing firm-paid and parent-paid CEOs in their first 
year of tenure in the firm. After considering the aging in place of CEOs, inferences are similar 
to those reported in Panel A: parent-paid CEOs tend to be older, are more likely to have 
experience in the government, are less likely to hold dual positions, are more likely to have a 
title in the parent firm and are more (less) likely to be promoted (demoted).  
Panel C of Table 2 decomposes all CEO turnovers in our sample. Out of the 1623 
cases of CEO turnover, more than 56% occurred in the firm-paid group. The promotion group 
represents 28.71 percent of turnovers, which is a significant proportion. Parent-paid CEOs are 
significantly more likely than firm-paid CEOs to leave due to a promotion, accounting for 
almost 73% of the total promotion cases. Turnover in all the other categories of turnover, 
including control right change, retirement, and demotion, occur much more frequently for 
firm-paid CEOs.  
(Insert Table 2 here) 
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4.2. Parent-paid CEOs and future promotion 
Table 3 provides the results of estimating model (1). The coefficients of Ppaid are 
significantly positive in the models for promotion and career outcome, and significantly 
negative for demotion. In the Promotion model (column 1), the value of the coefficient of 
Ppaid (0.66) implies that holding other variables at the mean value, there is a marginal 6.3% 
increase in the general promotion probability in parent-paid firms. In the demotion model, we 
find that being parent-paid is associated with 3.1% reduction in the probability of being 
demoted. Results for the ordered probit in column (3) provide evidence that parent-paid CEOs 
have more favorable career outcomes.11 For the dependent variable, we also try a variation 
with a lag of two years, i.e. Promotiont+2, and the results remain generally the same. In 
additional sensitivity analyses, we exclude turnovers due to retirements and changes in 
control rights. Further, we exclude observations with demotion from the promotion models 
and observations with promotions from the demotion model. Our results are robust to these 
variations. 
Results for control variables are generally in alignment with our expectations. AGE is 
significantly negatively associated with the probability of future promotion, likely because the 
Chinese government in principle does not promote any official who is older than 60. 
Surprisingly, we find holding dual positions in a firm (Dual), is significantly negatively 
related to both promotion and demotion, suggesting that having more roles in the listed firm 
makes it harder for a CEO to be replaced due to either promotion or demotion. A CEO’s work 
experience in the government also plays a significantly positive role in future promotion. 
AROA is not related to promotions in the probit model. But it is strongly negatively associated 
with demotions, indicating that CEOs with better operating performance during the tenure are 
                                                            




less likely to be demoted. The performance measure also has a significantly positive 
coefficient in the ordered probit model of career outcome. 
(Insert Table 3 here) 
It is possible that parent-paid CEOs have a higher (lower) probability of promotion 
(demotion) because they are more talented and they are selected for this type of contract. In 
this case, the increase in promotion is driven by selection rather than reflecting an increased 
promotion incentive. We investigate the issue of selection in several ways. These analyses 
investigate the CEO’s choice to enter into a parent-paid contract and changes in the promotion 
incentive as individual CEOs move from parent-paid to firm-paid contracts, and vice versa.  
Our first analysis of selection explores CEOs’ willingness to sign parent-paid 
contracts. Our basic argument is that parent-paid CEOs are strongly motivated by career 
concerns. This notion is supported by the lower explicit pay levels for these managers. To 
investigate whether career concerns are related to the CEO’s willingness to accept a parent-
paid contract with a lower salary, we estimate model (1) replacing Ppaid with Prepromotion, 
which takes value one if the company’s prior CEO was promoted and proxies for an ex ante 
expectation that the new CEO will be promoted; If the previous CEO was promoted, then the 
incoming CEO will likely assume that he has a similar likelihood of promotion. If the 
incoming CEO expects to have a higher likelihood of promotion, then he should be more 
likely to accept the lower level of pay associated with a parent-paid contract.  
Results reported in Table 4 are consistent with CEOs signing parent-paid contracts 
then there is a higher ex ante probability that they will be promoted. The coefficient of 
Prepromotion is significantly positive for the sample overall (column 1) and when we isolate 
the first year of the CEO’s tenure in a firm (column 2). These results provide evidence that 
CEOs consider the probability of promotion before they sign a parent-paid contract. In 
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additional analysis that are unreported, we estimate a two-stage model, employing the model 
reported in Table 4 as the first stage, and incorporating the resulting Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) 
into model (1). Controlling for selection in this manner does not change our inferences, and 
parent-paid CEOs continue to exhibit a higher (lower) probability of promotion (demotion).12    
(Insert Table 4 here) 
Use of parent-paid contracts is neither firm- nor CEO-specific. As a second means of 
addressing the potential selection issue we examine a subsample of CEOs whose 
compensation contracts have been switched, either from firm-paid to parent-paid or from 
parent-paid to firm-paid. This switch offers a unique setting to control for pre-selection effects 
since the sample of firms and CEOs is constant before and after the switch. As before, we 
include variables for CEO characteristics and firm performance. Controlling for these factors, 
we expect to see a decrease (increase) in the probability of promotion when the CEO switches 
from parent-paid to firm-paid (paid to parent-paid), which would be consistent with a greater 
use of promotion incentives when the CEO is parent-paid. 
Using subsamples of CEOs who switched contracts, matched with CEOs who did not 
switch, our logistic regression model is  
Promotiont+1 = β0 + β1Switcht + β2Aget + β3Male + β4Dualt + β5ROAt+ β6Sales Growtht  
+ β7Sizet + β8Leveraget + β9Largestt + β10CEOsharet + β11Governmentt  
+ εt                                                                                                       (2) 
 
where Switch is one of two variables: Ppaid to Fpaid (reported in Table 5) or Fpaid to Ppaid 
(reported in Table 6). As before, we examine the probability of promotion, demotion, and a 
combined measure of career outcome. For CEOs switching from parent-paid to firm-paid, we 
match with CEOs who are parent-paid during their entire tenure and construct the dummy 
variable Ppaid to Pay, which equals 1 if a CEO receives a positive salary and 0 otherwise. For 
                                                            
12
 Since lack of data on the prior CEO’s career outcome dramatically reduces sample size, we do not use this as 
our primary analysis. 
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CEOs switching from firm-paid to parent-paid, we match CEOs who switch from firm-paid to 
parent-paid with CEOs who are paid directly by their firms during their entire tenures and 
construct the dummy variable Fpaid to Ppaid, which equals 1 if a CEO receives no salary and 
0 otherwise.13 We expect Ppaid to Fpaid to be negatively associated with a CEO’s future 
chance of promotion and Fpaid to Ppaid to have positive association. 
Table 5 reports results of the promotion analysis for CEOs switching from parent-paid 
to firm-paid versus their matched parent-paid peers. We find that switching from parent-paid 
to firm-paid (Ppaid to Fpaid = 1) significantly hurts a CEO’s future chance of business 
promotion (column 1). Specifically, switching from a parent-paid contract to a firm-paid 
contract is associated with a 4.2% reduction in the probability of future promotion. Such a 
switch also increases the probability of a demotion by 2.1%. Overall, switching is associated 
with a significantly more negative career outcome. Table 6 reports regression results for 
CEOs switching from firm-paid to parent-paid versus their matched firm-paid peers. Fpaid to 
Ppaid has significant positive coefficients in the models for promotion and career outcome, 
and a significant negative coefficient for demotion. Column (1) indicates a 5.2% increase in 
the overall likelihood of promotion. Column (2) indicates a 5.1% decrease in the probability 
of demotion.   
(Insert Tables 5 and 6 here) 
Over all, the analyses on CEOs’ incentive method and future promotion provide 
evidence in support of H1, that is, that parent-paid CEOs have strong incentives related to 
their career concerns. While they may not receive performance-based pay in the current 
period, parent-paid CEOs enjoy a significantly higher probability of being promoted.  
4.3 The Split Share Structure Reform 
                                                            
13 Most CEOs who switch do so only once. Multiple switches are rare. Consideration of multiple switches does 
not impact our inferences. 
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 While our results show that parent-paid CEOs have stronger incentives from career 
concerns, there are some unresolved issues in interpreting our results. For example, the result 
that CEOs who switch between firm-paid and parent-paid contracts face different 
probabilities of (and hence incentives for) promotion may indicate secondary sorting by the 
companies. CEOs who are originally seen as less (more) talented and given a firm-paid 
(parent-paid) position but then elevated (reduced) to a parent-paid (firm-paid) position once 
their true type becomes known would produce results similar to those reported in our tables 5 
and 6. Our controls for CEO characteristics and firm performance in those models may not 
fully control for this possibility. To provide some additional insights, we examine a setting 
where the relative strength of the internal career concerns and market incentives changes due 
to exogenous changes in the regulatory environment.  
As we conjecture in H2, the Split Share Reform strengthens SOE market incentives 
and likely influences the nature of compensation incentives. Specifically, since the reform 
strengthens external monitoring, the substitute effect of internal governance suggests that 
promotion incentives for the parent-paid CEOs become relatively weaker.  
The reform provides a powerful test of the career concerns because it entailed 
staggered adoption. The reform started on April 29, 2005. Four hundred and three firms 
finished complying in 2005, 866 in 2006, 103 in 2007, 29 in 2008, and 17 between 2009 and 
2011. By the end of 2012, 10 firms had yet to complete adoption.  
To test H2, we adapt equation (1) by including a dummy variable (Reform) for the 
period after firms’ reform adoption and an interaction term Ppaid × Reform, which is an 
interaction term between CEO payment type and the post-reform period. If the reform 
weakens the use of promotion incentives for parent-paid CEOs, we would expect to see a 
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negative coefficient of the interaction terms in the models for promotion and career outcome, 
and a positive coefficient of the interaction in the demotion model.  
Table 7 provides results of the regression analysis. For parsimony, we only report 
coefficients of the variables of interest. Panel A reports results for career outcomes in the 
following year. Similar to results of prior analyses, Ppaid is positive and significant in the 
models for promotion and career outcome (columns 1 and 3 respectively) and negative and 
significant model for demotion (column 2). Although results for the interaction term in the 
promotion model (column 1) are inconsistent with our expectations, the reform appears to 
have dampened incentives related to demotions and reduced overall career outcomes, at least 
in the short term. In Table 7, panel B, when we extend the window for promotion/demotion to 
two years, all results are consistent with H2. F tests of Reform + Ppaid × Reform suggest that, 
after the reform, there still a significant difference in the probability of promotion/demotion 
between being firm-paid and parent-paid, although based upon the significant interaction term, 
the difference narrows. These results provide evidence that the incentives provided to firm-
paid and parent-paid CEOs moved closer together after the reform, potentially because market 
incentives partially replaced career incentives. 14 
(Insert Table 7 here) 
4.3. Parent-paid CEOs and firm performance 
Assuming the two different types of incentive mechanism are applied appropriately in 
equilibrium, ceteris paribus there should be no difference in the CEOs’ performance outcome. 
However, based upon our hypotheses H3a-H3c and univariate analysis results, we examine 
                                                            
14 Disclosure requirements for compensation information underwent several changes during our sample period. 
From 1999 to 2001, Chinese listed firms were only required to disclose a range of compensation for their CEOs. 
From 2001 to 2005, disclosure requirements were expanded to include the sum of total compensation for the 
three highest-paid executives. Finally, starting from 2006, all listed firms must report each individual executive’s 
total compensation, which is the sum of salary, bonus, stipends, and other benefits. Since unpaid CEOs’ 
compensation was not disclosed until 2012, which is after our sample period, changes in disclosure do not affect 
our tests of H2. 
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whether CEOs with promotion incentives perform differently than their firm-paid peers. In 
our tests for differences in performance across contract types, we control for selection issues 
using a two-stage model: 
Ppaidt = β0 + β1IndustryPayt + β2Aget + β3Dualt + β4Sizet + β5Leveraget  
+ β6Largestt + β7CEOSharet + β8Governmentt +β9Idirectort+ εt      (3a) 
 
Performancet = β0 + β1Ppaidt + β2Aget + β3Dualt + β4Sizet + β5Leveraget + β6Largestt 
 + β7CEOSharet + β8Governmentt +β9Idirectort + β9IMR+  εt          (3b)                                             
 
where the first-stage regression predicts the probability of a CEO being granted with a parent-
paid contract, and the second-stage regression examines the effect of parent-paid incentive 
mechanism on firm performance. The first stage employs IndustryPay as an instrumental 
variable while controlling for all other control variables in regression model (3b). IndustryPay 
is defined as the percentage of parent-paid executives in the SOEs from same industry.  High 
industry percentage of parent-paid executives may indicate existence of an industry norm, and 
thus positively relate to a firm’s parent-pay practice. The opportunities for future promotion 
are mainly determined by local government where a SOE is located and are not necessarily 
related to the industry norm. Performance is measured with different variables, depending on 
the hypothesis we are testing. For tests of H3a, Performance is either ROA, which is defined 
as the firm’s net income deflated by its average assets, or RET, which is the firm’s annual 
buy-and-hold stock return adjusted by market return. For our test of H3b, Performance is 
Asset turnover, which is total sales divided by average total assets. For our tests of H3c, 
Performance is Sales growth, which is the firm’s sales in year t minus sales in year t-1, 
deflated by sales in year t-1; ΔAssets, which is the percentage change in total assets; and 
ΔEmployees, which is log change in the number of employees. These variables capture 
different aspects of firm performance, especially given the specific nature of Chinese SOEs. 
ROA is the traditional accounting measure for a firm’s profitability. RET captures a firm’s 
success from the perspective of the financial market. Asset turnover measures how efficiently 
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the firm can turn its assets into sales. Sales growth, ΔAssets, and ΔEmployees measure the 
firm’s speed of expansion. Expansion is especially meaningful for SOEs, since government-
owned enterprises emphasize growth in business scale.  
Table 8 reports results of our analyses. In the first stage regression (column 1), our 
instrumental variable is positively related to whether a CEO receives compensation from the 
parent company. Among the six measures of firm performance reported in columns (2-7), 
ROA is positively associated with Ppaid with a statistical significance at 5% level. 
Specifically, having a parent-paid CEO is associated with 0.5% increase in a firm’s return on 
assets, after controlling for other important variables. Moreover, Ppaid is positively 
associated with ΔAsset, which is significant at the 1% level, implying that a parent-paid CEO 
is associated with 2.9% of growth in the company’s asset. However, Ppaid is not significant 
in explaining stock return, asset turnover, sales growth, or the change in the company’s 
number of employees. In sum, we find that firms with parent-paid CEOs perform at least 
similar to those with firm-paid CEOs. We provide evidence that firms with parent-paid CEOs 
outperform the control group along some dimensions.  
In addition to our variable of interest, several of the control variables are significantly 
related to the different performance measures. Company size (Size) is generally positive and 
significant in explaining firm performance, indicating that larger firms tend to perform better. 
Leverage is generally negatively associated with firm performance, implying that a more 
indebted firm is less likely to perform well. The percentage of government ownership, 
Largest, is positively and significantly associated with ROA and ΔAssets. Thus the more 
shares the Chinese government owns, the better the firm seems to perform with respect to 
ROA and growth of assets. We also control for CEO characteristics as potentially explaining 
firm performance outcomes. Although CEO share ownership in Chinese SOE firms is 
generally low, ownership (CEOShare) is   associated with sales growth and asset growth. 
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Whether a CEO holds dual titles in a firm (Dual) is significantly associated with all measures 
of performance, but is negatively associated with ROA and positively associated with all 
other measures. The CEO’s age has mixed results and does not seem to consistently affect 
firm performance. Whether a CEO has a government background relates positively to ROA, 
but negatively with stock return and asset turnover. Further, the inverse Mills ratio is 
statistically significant in all six columns of the table, indicating existence of a selection issue 
in the analyses of parent-paid incentive’s effect on firm performance. 
(Insert Table 8 here) 
4.4. Parent-paid CEOs and tunneling 
Hypothesis H4 explores the association between CEO incentives and tunneling. 
Because we provide arguments both consistent with and contradictory to tunneling by firms 
with parent-paid CEOs, we do not have any specific sign predictions. For our hypothesis test, 
we estimate the two-stage model in equations (3a) and (3b), replacing the dependent variable 
in model (3b) with two proxies for tunneling. Following Cheung et al. (2010), Jiang et al. 
(2010), and Jian and Wong (2010), Transfer is defined as total amount of fund transfers 
through related party transactions from the listed firm to its parent company, other firms in 
the same group, or both over total assets. OtherAR is defined as the firm’s balance of other 
receivables over total assets.  
Table 9 presents results of second-stage regression model (3b). Results indicate that 
Ppaid is significantly negatively associated with Transfer, indicating that companies with 
parent-paid CEOs engage in less tunneling. Having a parent-paid CEO is associated with an 
average of 0.6% less net transfer to the related parties. Ppaid is not significantly related to 
OtherAR. While our univariate results indicate a nonzero level of tunneling for our firms, this 
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activity is lower in firms with parent-paid executives. Thus, it does not appear that parent-paid 
CEOs are put in place to extract resources for the parent SOE. 
(Insert Table 9 here) 
Although not directly related to our hypothesis H4, as an additional test we investigate 
the impact of the reform on firm performance and tunneling behavior. As market incentives 
become more important for all firms, there may be a greater focus on financial performance. 
We thus expect an improvement in financial performance for all companies. This 
improvement may differ across firms with firm-paid versus parent-paid CEOs, however. As 
market incentives become stronger after the reform and consistent with our results in table 8, 
differences in incentives for firm-paid versus parent-paid CEOs likely become less extreme. If 
so, there should be less difference in financial performance between the two sets of firms. In 
addition, market objectives, such as improved ROA, should become more important than 
SOE-specific objectives, such as sales growth or tunneling. In untabulated results, we find 
that the Reform was associated with improvements in ROA, stock market return, asset 
turnover, sales growth, and a decrease in tunneling through other receivables. This positive 
impact of the reform on ROA, and sales growth was significantly less for parent-paid firms, 
however. These results are consistent with closer alignment of incentives across parent-paid 
and firm-paid CEOs. We also find that both types of tunneling decreased significantly more 
for parent-paid firms.  
Taking all of our results together, we find that the Split Share Structure Reform 
provided stronger link between executive incentives and stock market performance for all 
firms. In the course of doing so, it weakened the strength of future promotion as an incentive 
for SOE CEOs and consistent with closer alignment of incentives, reduced performance 
differences between parent- and firm-paid firms. 
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4.5. Robustness tests 
Our results provide evidence that parent-paid CEOs are associated with a significantly 
higher chance of future promotion. One potential concern is that these executives work 
mainly in the parent firms and have only nominal positions in the listed firms. To mitigate this 
concern, we conduct a robustness test focusing on executives with dual titles, i.e., serving as 
both the chairperson of the board and the general manager of the firms. Since the job of a 
general manager usually involves the firm’s day-to-day operations, an executive with dual 
titles are most likely to work full-time at the firm. Columns (1)-(3) of Table 10 present results 
of regressions with the interaction between dual title and parent-paid dummy. The coefficient 
of the interaction term is positive and significant in Column (1), but insignificant in Column 
(2) and Column (3), suggesting that parent-paid CEOs, who are more involved in the firms’ 
operations have an increased likelihood of promotion.  
Another factor that may affect promotion decisions for our sample firms is turnover in 
the local government. Turnover creates uncertainty regarding promotion decisions for existing 
SOE CEOs. New political leaders may reevaluate the competence and the loyalty of 
subordinates, which potentially results in greater SOE turnover. On the other hand, if a parent-
paid executive has pre-arranged career path, turnover within the political hierarchy can 
provide an opportunity for career progression. We construct a dummy variable to measure 
government turnover, GTurnover, which takes value 1 if there is turnover of the governor in 
the province where the ultimate controlling owner of a listed firm resides, and 0 otherwise. In 
Table 10, we find evidence that government turnover primarily affects the probability of 
demotions, decreasing their probability. We continue to find evidence that parent-paid CEOs 
have a higher promotion (lower demotion) probability after controlling the uncertainty from 
government turnover. To mitigate the concerns of selection effects, we further control the 
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number of job titles CEOs hold in other firms, including in the parent company. Our results 
remain qualitatively the same.  
(Insert Table 10 here) 
The last robustness check we perform involves the perquisites our sample CEOs may 
receive. It is well known that Chinese executives enjoy non-cash perquisites in addition to 
their monetary compensation. This non-cash compensation has performance implications 
(Yermack 2006; Rajan and Wulf 2006) and may drive our results for H3a-H3c and H4. To 
mitigate this alternative explanation, we re-estimate our performance and tunneling models, 
incorporating a proxy for perquisites, Mperk as a control.  
Unlike the United States, China does not require listed firms to disclose executive 
perks. Therefore we rely on administrative expense (Admin Expense) to estimate the amount 
of perquisite compensation. Following Luo et al. (2011), we regard the abnormal level of 
administrative expenses as Mperk. The normal level of administrative expenses (Nexp) is 
estimated by using the following equation for each year and for each industry:
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Admin Expenset is total administrative expenses, excluding annual provisions of asset 
impairments and direct compensation for directors and top executives. Assetst-1 is lagged total 
assets. △Salest is change in sales. PPEt is net value of property, plant, and equipment. Invt is 
year-end value of inventories. LnEmployeet is natural log of number of employees. Mperk is 
calculated as the difference between Admin Expense and Nexp. 
 Table 11 presents the results on the impact of executive perks. Results supporting our 
hypotheses are now stronger; with additional significant results relating to asset turnover 
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(H3b) and sales growth (H3c).  We thus find that after controlling executive perks, firms with 
parent-paid CEOs tend to have higher financial performance, operational efficiency, and 
tunnel less. 
(Insert Table 11 here) 
5. Conclusion 
We examine an unusual phenomenon of Chinese executives receiving zero pay from 
the firms for which they work. Rather than being paid by their immediate employer, these 
executives are paid by their SOE parent companies. We find that these CEOs are strongly 
motivated and disciplined by the opportunity of future promotion. Indeed, compared to their 
firm-paid peers, parent-paid CEOs have a significantly higher probability of being promoted. 
We also find that firms with parent-paid CEOs outperform their peer firms and engage in less 
tunneling from the subsidiaries to the controlling parent firms. The results are robust to 
alternative means of controlling for endogeneity and prescreening effects. 
To provide additional evidence regarding promotion-related incentives, we conduct an 
event study using the Split Share Structure Reform in 2006. This reform resulted in a 
strengthening of market incentives for all SOEs in China. We find evidence consistent with 
this increased in emphasis on market incentives resulting in movement away from use of 
promotion incentives. Our evidence indicates a reduction in the use of promotion incentives, 
with the probability of promotion for parent-paid CEOs declining following the reform.  
Our setting provides a unique opportunity to empirically explore the effectiveness of 
career concerns relative to monetary incentives through performance-based pay. Prior 
research could only use inexact measures such as the executives’ age and tenure to proxy for 
career concerns. The Chinese SOE setting provides a stronger analysis of career concerns, 
because the firm-paid and parent-paid executives face demonstrably different incentives. 
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Our results also illuminate executive compensation mechanisms in Chinese SOEs and 
help explain how parent-paid CEOs can have strong incentives to perform, even in the 
absence of strong pay-performance incentives. We show that the concerns raised by the 
Chinese popular press about a lack of performance incentives are ungrounded and that the 
firms with parent-paid CEOs perform at least as well as, if not better than, the control group 
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Appendix A: Illustration of the structure of a local SOE  
Tianjin Teda Corp is a listed SOE, stock code 000652. It is controlled by the government 





         
 
Huiwen Liu was the chairman of Tianjin Teda Corp from 1997 to 2011, receiving no 
compensation from the listed firm. He was also the chairman of Teda Investment Holding Co. 
from 2006 to 2011. In May 2011, at the age of 57, he resigned all his titles to become the 
chairman of Bohai Property Insurance Co., an unlisted SOE with a revenue of RMB1.5 billion, 
which is much smaller than the RMB51 billion revenue of Tianjin Teda Corp. His successor, 
Jun Zhang, the general manager of Teda Group Co. since 2008, became the chairman of 
Tianjin Teda Corp. Jun Zhang did not receive compensation from the listed firm either. After 
two years of service at the listed firm, at the age of 46, he was promoted to vice president of 
Teda Investment Holding in February 2013.  
SASAC of Tianjin 
City 
Teda Investment Holding Co., Ltd 
Teda Group Co., Ltd 






TABLE 1  
Sample distribution 
Year Firm-paid CEOs Parent-paid CEOs Total 
1999 365 233 598 
2000 399 276 675 
2001 433 277 710 
2002 443 266 709 
2003 438 253 691 
2004 445 241 686 
2005 412 251 663 
2006 398 236 634 
2007 393 256 649 
2008 367 276 643 
2009 371 268 639 
2010 375 280 655 
2011 384 266 650 







TABLE 2  
Summary statistics 
Panel A: comparison between samples of firm-paid ceos and parent-paid ceos at firm level 
  Parent-paid CEO (1) Firm-paid CEO (2)   
  N Mean median N Mean median (2) - (1) 
Age 3379 50.955 51 5222 50.408 51 -0.547*** 
Male 3379 0.967 1 5222 0.96 1 -0.007* 
Government 3379 0.421 0 5222 0.346 0 -0.075*** 
Dual 3379 0.02 0 5222 0.189 0 0.170*** 
Tenure 3379 4.467 3 5222 4.559 4 0.092 
Shareholdertitle 2869 0.774 1 4454 0.458 0 -0.316*** 
Titles 2869 1.765 1 4454 1.294 1 -0.470*** 
Promotion 3379 0.101 0 5222 0.024 0 -0.077*** 
Demotion 3379 0.065 0 5222 0.092 0 0.027*** 
CareerOutcome 3379 0.036 0 5222 -0.068 0 -0.104*** 
Prepromotion 1864 0.383 0 2416 0.264 0 -0.119*** 
Assets 
(billions) 
3379 4.576 2.091 5222 3.98 1.717 -0.596*** 
Leverage 3379 0.506 0.496 5222 0.505 0.501 -0.001 
CEOshare 3379 0.0001 0 5222 0.0008 0 0.0007*** 
Largest 3379 0.453 0.455 5222 0.41 0.396 -0.042*** 
Idirector 3379 0.282 0.333 5222 0.28 0.333 -0.002 
ROA 3379 0.031 0.033 5222 0.028 0.031 -0.002 
Sales growth 3379 0.227 0.134 5222 0.184 0.138 -0.043*** 
RET 3379 -0.016 -0.052 5222 -0.036 -0.058 -0.020** 
Asset turnover 3379 0.7 0.575 5221 0.159 0.537 -0.047*** 
Δassets 3379 0.167 0.09 4605 -0.004 0.092 -0.009 
Δemployees 3026 -0.026 0 5222 0.047 0.008 0.022 
Admin 
Expense 
3379 0.046 0.038 5222 0.008 0.039 0.001 
Transfer 3379 0.006 0 5222 0.054 0 0.002 
OtherRA 3379 0.05 0.018 5221 0.159 0.023 0.004** 
 
Panel B: subsample comparison between firm-paid ceos and parent-paid ceos in the first year 
of tenure 
  Parent-paid CEO (1) Firm-paid CEO (2)   
  N Mean median N Mean median (2) - (1) 
Age 704 48.274  48 697 46.666  47 -1.608*** 
Male 704 0.970  1 697 0.954  1 -0.016 
Government 704 0.422  0 697 0.337  0 -0.085*** 
Dual 704 0.023  0 697 0.188  0 0.165*** 
Shareholdertitle 636 0.736  1 638 0.415  0 -0.320*** 
Titles 636 1.492  1 638 0.854  1 -0.638*** 
CEOshare 704 0.000  0 697 0.000  0 0.00 






Panel C: CEO turnovers by type 
         Firm-paid Parent-paid 
  total N Percent N Percent 
All Turnovers 1623 913 56.25% 710 43.75% 
   Promotion 466 126 27.04% 340 72.96% 
   Change in control right 218 148 67.89% 70 32.11% 
   Retirement 235 156 66.38% 79 33.62% 
   Demotion 704 483 68.61% 221 31.39% 
 
This table provides comparative statistics between firm-paid CEOs and Parent-paid CEOs at 
the firm level (Panel A) and at the executive level in the starting year of tenure (Panel B). Age: 
a CEO’s age; Male: dummy variable, 1 if a CEO is male and 0 otherwise; Government, a 
dummy variable, 1 if a CEO worked for government or military and 0 otherwise; Dual: 
dummy variable, 1 if the chairman is also general manager and 0 otherwise; Tenure, the 
number of years as CEO; Shareholdertitle, a dummy variable, 1 if a CEO has a job title in the 
parent company and 0 otherwise; Titles, the number of titles a CEO has other than those in a 
listed firm; Prepromotion, a dummy variable, 1 if a CEO’ predecessor leaves for a job in 
government, a higher position in the parent group, or an executive position of a larger firm 
and 0 otherwise; Promotion, a dummy variable, 1 if a CEO leaves for a job in government, a 
higher position in the parent group, or an executive position of a larger firm in year t+1 and 0 
otherwise; Demotion, a dummy variable, 1 if a CEO leaves due to reasons other than 
retirement, change in control right, or promotion, and 0 otherwise; Career outcome: -1 if a 
CEO is demoted, 1 if promoted, and 0 for the rest; Assets, total assets in billions; Leverage, 
total liabilities deflated by total assets; CEOshare: the percentage of stock owned by a CEO; 
Largest: the percentage of stock owned by the largest shareholder; Idirector, the percentage of 
independent directors on board; ROA: net income deflated by average assets; Sales growth: 
sales in year t minus sales in year t-1, deflated by sales in year t-1; RET: annual buy-and-hold 
stock return adjusted by market return; Asset turnover: total sales divided by average total 
assets; Δassets: percentage change in total assets; Δemployees: log change in number of 
employees; Admin Expense: administrative expenses excluding annual provisions for asset 
impairments and total executive and director compensation, deflated by total assets; Transfer: 
funds transferred from the listed firm to its parent company and/or other firms in the same 
group; OtherRA: other receivables divided by total assets. ***, **, and * denote significant 
differences across subsamples at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Panel C describes 




TABLE 3  
Career outcome and CEO pay type 
 Promotion Demotion CareerOutcome 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
Ppaid 0.658*** -0.231*** 0.425*** 
 (12.79) (-5.21) (11.83) 
Age -0.519*** 0.128 -0.267** 
 (-3.19) (0.83) (-2.33) 
Male 0.117 -0.129 0.118 
 (0.84) (-1.32) (1.44) 
Dual -0.331*** -0.267*** 0.068 
 (-3.12) (-4.00) (1.63) 
AROA -0.799 -2.012*** 0.934** 
 (-1.60) (-4.54) (2.47) 
Sales growth -0.056 -0.144*** 0.052 
 (-1.08) (-2.74) (1.55) 
Size 0.019 -0.058** 0.041** 
 (0.71) (-2.56) (2.33) 
Leverage 0.026 0.053 -0.031 
 (0.20) (0.46) (-0.33) 
Largest 0.124 -0.005 0.047 
 (0.79) (-0.04) (0.45) 
CEOshare -3.317 -15.152 1.585** 
 (-0.40) (-1.22) (2.26) 
Government 0.211*** -0.126*** 0.159*** 
 (4.08) (-2.81) (4.49) 
Constant -0.162 -0.291  
 (-0.21) (-0.39)  
Cut1   -1.322** 
   (-2.40) 
Cut2   1.776*** 
   (3.22) 
Observations 8,601 8,601 8,601 
Pseudo R2 0.0901 0.0374 0.0323 
This table presents results of career outcome and CEO pay type. In Column (1), the dependent 
variable of probit model is Promotion, a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the chairman 
leaves for a job in the government, a higher position in the parent group, or an executive 
position of a larger firm in year t+1 and otherwise zero. In Column (2), the dependent variable 
is Demotion, a dummy variable that equals to 1 if CEO turnover due to reasons other than 
retirement, control right transfer, or promotion and 0 otherwise. In Column (3), the dependent 
variable of ordered probit model is Career outcome that equals to -1 if a CEO is demoted, 1 if 
promoted, and 0 for the rest. AROA is the average ROA during a CEO’s tenure in a given year. 
Other variables are defined in Table 2. We control fixed effects of industry and year. Z 
statistics based on robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 




TABLE 4  
CEO pay type and ex ante probability of promotion 
 Full sample First year of tenure 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
Prepromotion 0.281*** 0.218*** 
 (6.33) (2.65) 
Age 0.768*** 0.674** 
 (4.64) (2.37) 
Male 0.576*** 0.327 
 (4.45) (1.54) 
Dual -1.456*** -1.410*** 
 (-14.62) (-8.96) 
ROA -0.297 0.348 
 (-0.75) (0.54) 
Sales growth 0.051 -0.004 
 (1.14) (-0.06) 
Size 0.014 -0.055 
 (0.61) (-1.34) 
Leverage 0.237** 0.384** 
 (2.00) (1.96) 
Largest 0.776*** 0.420 
 (5.42) (1.63) 
CEOshare -282.313 -58.407 
 (-1.60) (-0.48) 
Government 0.120*** 0.202** 
 (2.64) (2.49) 
Constant -5.949*** -3.726** 
 (-6.78) (-2.52) 
Observations 4,280 1,281 
Pseudo R2 0.1162 0.1164 
 
This table presents results of probit model of CEO pay type. The dependent variable is Ppaid, 
a dummy variable that equals to 1 if a chairman receives compensation from a listed firm’s 
parent company instead of the listed firm and 0 otherwise. We proxy a CEO’s ex ante 
probability of promotion by Prepromotion, a dummy variable that equals to 1 if a CEO’s 
predecessor gets promotion (i.e., leaving for a job in government, a higher position in the 
parent group, or an executive position of a larger firm) and 0 otherwise. We use full sample 
and first year of tenure in Column (1) and (2) respectively. Variables are defined in Table 2. 
We control fixed effects of industry and year. Z statistics based on robust standard errors are 




TABLE 5  
Switching from parent-paid to firm-paid and CEO career outcome 
 Promotion Demotion CareerOutcome 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
Ppaid to Fpaid -0.335*** 0.157* -0.227*** 
 (-3.23) (1.72) (-3.52) 
Age -0.397* 0.654** -0.515*** 
 (-1.76) (2.21) (-2.70) 
Male 0.069 -0.426** 0.291* 
 (0.35) (-2.46) (1.74) 
Dual -0.101 -0.094 -0.031 
 (-0.54) (-0.50) (-0.24) 
AROA -0.557 -2.186*** 0.682 
 (-0.95) (-3.36) (1.35) 
Sales growth -0.008 -0.093 0.034 
 (-0.13) (-1.48) (0.80) 
Size -0.007 -0.026 0.008 
 (-0.19) (-0.76) (0.31) 
Leverage 0.141 -0.154 0.161 
 (0.89) (-0.85) (1.22) 
Largest 0.082 -0.332 0.211 
 (0.40) (-1.40) (1.30) 
CEOshare -600.305 20.415 -18.348* 
 (-1.21) (1.07) (-1.72) 
Government 0.110* -0.195*** 0.157*** 
 (1.69) (-2.68) (3.12) 
Constant 0.440 -2.526**  
 (0.41) (-1.99)  
Cut1   -2.790*** 
   (-3.24) 
Cut2   0.044 
   (0.05) 
Observations 3,524 3,524 3,524 
Pseudo R2 0.0362 0.0427 0.0205 
This table uses a subsample of CEOs who change from parent-paid contracts to firm-paid 
contracts during their tenures and CEOs who have parent-paid contracts during their tenures. 
In Column (1), the dependent variable of probit model is Promotion, a dummy variable that 
equals to 1 if the chairman leaves for a job in the government, a higher position in the parent 
group, or an executive position of a larger firm in year t+1 and otherwise zero. In Column (2), 
the dependent variable is Demotion, a dummy variable that equals to 1 if CEO turnover due to 
reasons other than retirement, control right transfer, or promotion and 0 otherwise. In Column 
(3), the dependent variable of ordered probit model is Career outcome that equals to -1 if a 
CEO is demoted, 1 if promoted, and 0 for the rest. Ppaid to Fpaid, a dummy variable, is 1 if a 
CEO receives any salary from their firms and zero otherwise. AROA is the average ROA 
during a CEO’s tenure in a given year. Other variables are defined in Table 2. We control 
fixed effects of industry and year. Z statistics based on robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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TABLE 6  
Switching from being firm-paid to parent-paid and CEO career outcome 
 Promotion Demotion CareerOutcome 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
Fpaid to Ppaid 0.689*** -0.468*** 0.596*** 
 (6.46) (-3.71) (6.40) 
Age -0.721*** -0.081 -0.141 
 (-2.96) (-0.44) (-0.93) 
Male 0.103 -0.024 0.054 
 (0.48) (-0.19) (0.54) 
Dual -0.420*** -0.304*** 0.108** 
 (-3.11) (-4.20) (2.16) 
AROA -0.952 -1.926*** 1.229** 
 (-1.01) (-3.15) (2.26) 
Sales growth -0.268*** -0.194** 0.068 
 (-2.74) (-2.39) (1.34) 
Size 0.088** -0.085*** 0.080*** 
 (2.12) (-2.73) (3.22) 
Leverage -0.251 0.180 -0.224* 
 (-1.07) (1.16) (-1.66) 
Largest 0.316 0.130 -0.006 
 (1.23) (0.75) (-0.04) 
CEOshare -0.041 -15.290 1.700** 
 (-0.01) (-1.09) (2.01) 
Government 0.354*** -0.105* 0.184*** 
 (3.80) (-1.78) (3.54) 
Constant -0.719 0.787  
 (-0.61) (0.83)  
Cut1   -0.315 
   (-0.41) 
Cut2   3.089*** 
   (4.02) 
Observations 5,077 5,077 5,077 
Pseudo R2 0.1017 0.0493 0.0357 
This table uses a subsample of CEOs who change from firm-paid to parent-paid contracts 
during their tenures and CEOs who remain firm-paid during their tenures. In Column (1), the 
dependent variable of probit model is Promotion, a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the 
chairman leaves for a job in the government, a higher position in the parent group, or an 
executive position of a larger firm in year t+1 and otherwise zero. In Column (2), the 
dependent variable is Demotion, a dummy variable that equals to 1 if CEO turnover due to 
reasons other than retirement, control right transfer, or promotion and 0 otherwise. In Column 
(3), the dependent variable of ordered probit model is Career outcome that equals to -1 if a 
CEO is demoted, 1 if promoted, and 0 for the rest. Fpaid to Ppaid, a dummy variable, is 1 if a 
CEO receives no salary and zero otherwise. AROA is the average ROA during a CEO’s tenure 
in a given year. Other variables are defined in Table 2. We control fixed effects of industry 
and year. Z statistics based on robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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TABLE 7  
Impact of split-share reform in 2005 on future promotion/demotion 
 
Panel A: Future promotion/demotion in year t+1 
  Promotion Demotion CareerOutcome 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
Ppaid 0.703*** -0.318*** 0.519*** 
 
-10.24 (-5.23) -10.28 
Reform -0.907 -2.104 0.7 
 
(-0.57) (-1.42) -0.65 
Ppaid × Reform -0.093 0.196** -0.202*** 
 
(-0.91) -2.21 (-2.90) 
Test: Ppaid + Ppaid x Reform = 0 
χ2 62.29*** 3.46* 40.14*** 
Observations 8,601 8,601 8,601 
Pseudo R2 0.095 0.043 0.035 
Panel B: Future promotion/demotion in year t+2 
  Promotion Demotion CareerOutcome 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
Ppaid 0.786*** -0.356*** 0.584*** 
 
-13.68 (-6.75) -13.16 
Reform -0.946 -1.671 0.444 
 
(-0.71) (-1.32) -0.47 
Ppaid × Reform -0.190** 0.187** -0.230*** 
 
(-2.27) -2.41 (-3.76) 
Test: Ppaid + Ppaid x Reform = 0 
χ2 94.37*** 8.71*** 67.17*** 
Observations 8,601 8,601 8,601 
Pseudo R2 0.106 0.038 0.037 
 
Reform, a dummy variable, is 1 if the stock owned by the government is tradable and zero 
otherwise. Other variables are defined in Table 2. Interaction between Reform and control 
variables are also included. For parsimony, control variables are not included in the table, but 
are available from the authors. We include fixed effects for year and industry. Z statistics 
based on robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE 9  
Second-stage regression results on the association between CEO contract type and tunneling  
 
 Transfer OtherAR 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
   
Ppaid -0.006** -0.002 
 (-2.53) (-0.97) 
Age 0.011 0.003 
 (1.30) (0.38) 
Dual -0.007 0.001 
 (-1.18) (0.13) 
Size 0.005** -0.001 
 (2.16) (-0.35) 
Leverage -0.004 0.082*** 
 (-0.38) (8.74) 
Largest -0.029** -0.033*** 
 (-2.27) (-3.06) 
CEO share 0.027 -0.312 
 (0.07) (-0.81) 
Government -0.000 -0.001 
 (-0.00) (-0.46) 
Idirector -0.006 0.000 
 (-0.51) (0.02) 
IMR 0.004 0.002 
 (0.86) (0.37) 
Observations 8,594 8,594 
R2 0.412 0.580 
Number of firms 1027 1027 
Transfer is funds transferred from the listed firm to its parent company and/or other firms in the 
same group. OtherAR is the balance of other receivables over total assets. Variables are defined 
in Table 2. We control fixed effects of firm, year, and industry. T statistics based on robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
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